Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 24

Issue 3

Article 12

7-1-2007

Vincent Brümmer, ATONEMENT, CHRISTOLOGY AND THE
TRINITY: MAKING SENSE OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE
Andrew S. Nam

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Nam, Andrew S. (2007) "Vincent Brümmer, ATONEMENT, CHRISTOLOGY AND THE TRINITY: MAKING
SENSE OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers:
Vol. 24 : Iss. 3 , Article 12.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil200724321
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol24/iss3/12

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

BOOK REVIEWS

357

historical prototype and an embarrassment (a fact which Cottingham does
not consider). But a more serious issue has to do with the view of 'religion'
presented here. The book assumes that 'what it is to adhere to a religion'
finds paradigmatic articulation in the 'great religious writers' of Christian
ity, supplemented by the reflections of philosophers such as Wittgenstein,
for whom the boundaries of religion could be remarkably clear. The re
ligion described therein is deeply moral, sacramentally rich, tolerant of
diversity, and characterized by 'compassion and universalism.' Such a re
ligion is certainly compatible with 'intellectual integrity and philosophical
vigor,' and so is suited to the book's apologetic aims. But not all religion,
not even all Christianity, is like this. Cottingham does not consider such
forms of Christian praxis as protesting homosexuality at military funerals,
firebombing abortion clinics, or teaching one's children in the home-school
classroom that the earth is eight thousand years old; but taking seriously
the primacy of praxis, and understanding 'how religious language actu
ally functions' in the lives of its adherents, would seem to lead naturally
to considering such cases. There is a significant tension between that ideal
of religion which Cottingham shares with his chosen sources and the goal
of understanding religion as lived, both of which he is concerned to recom
mend; and in the end, this book suggests that philosophers in search of a
deeper understanding of religion may need, in ways large and small, to
choose between these two.

Atonement, Christology and the Trinity: Making Sense o f Christian Doctrine, by
Vincent Brummer. Ashgate, 2005. viii+125 pp. $29.95 (Paper).
ANDREW S. NAM, Baylor University
Brummer's central concern is to make sense of the Christian doctrines of
atonement, Christology, and the trinity in terms of a category congenial
to our contemporary mindset: reconciliation. By doing so, he hopes to gain
a sympathetic hearing from both average Christian believers for whom a
typical abstract theological construction of those doctrines means little or
no existential applicability, and those of Jewish and Islamic traditions for
whom these doctrines constitute an enduring stumbling block.
In chapter 1, Brummer explains the limitations of metaphorical thinking,
our common, intuitive practice of seeking to understand things by com
paring them to similar objects with which we are familiar. Metaphorical
thinking regularly employed in theological abstraction (1) often fails to
recognize the relevant differences between the objects of comparison, (2)
is one-sided and selective, necessarily excluding other models due to ir
resolvable conceptual conflicts, and (3) tends to be purely theoretical and
abstract, thereby losing touch with the present cultural framework of un
derstanding and the existential nature of our relationship to God. Accord
ingly, it results in a static view of God.
Furthermore, there is 'commissive implication,' a certain set of moral,
emotional, and practical commitments, to every conceptual grammar of
the religious language game, such that we cannot understand a religious

358

Faith and Philosophy

language without a certain level of participation. The foregoing reasons,
for Brummer, thus favor existential thinking about the religious language.
By existential thinking, we understand God in relational terms expressive
of the ways in which we ought to relate to God in action and thinking.
We also address the question as to how to draw properly the limit of our
conceptual language; all speculative thinking beyond such existential con
siderations is at best to be treated agnostically and apophatically.
In chapter 2, Brummer lays a foundation for the existential conception
of Christian doctrines by providing a Christian answer to the question:
What is ultimate happiness? The necessary and sufficient condition for
ultimate happiness is defined in terms of a loving relationship with God,
which requires us voluntarily to choose the Good in life and to be known
and loved by God—the mystical union. However, such happiness is beyond
our reach, as we have become estranged from God through sin. Chapter
3 is devoted to explaining the rest of 'the matrix of faith,' namely what is
necessitated to restore the broken fellowship.
Two necessary conditions for reconciliation are stated: forgiveness by
the offended person and penitence and a change of heart in the offender.
Forgiveness requires the victim to suffer the pain of bearing the injury, and
not pay back the offender, for the victim values the loving fellowship more
than her "right" to punish. When the offender responds to such forgiving
act with true repentance, reconciliation is attained. For Brummer, reconciliation—though an analogy drawn from human experience—constitutes
the most relevant and salient way of understanding Christian doctrines
for us today, as our recent history is marked by significant events dealing
with grave offenses, deep resentment, and a need for reconciliation (e.g.,
Jews and Nazi soldiers, Apartheid, etc.).
Using reconciliation as a primary concept, Brummer lodges criticisms
against traditional models of the atonement in chapter 4. The Platonist
influence in Patristic theology (i.e., the universal is more real than the
particular) led to broadly three models of atonement: recapitulation,
ransom, and sacrifice. Adam's Fall is understood as a corporate act in
volving humanity as a whole, resulting in bondage under Satan, sin
and death. According to these theories, atonement in Christ's death is a
ransom or sacrifice on behalf of humanity, or the state of humanity 're
capitulated' in the corporate personality of Christ. The traditional prob
lems inherent in these theories notwithstanding, the deepest problem
for Brummer is the Platonist assumption that seems rather strange to
the contemporary mindset: Just how does salvation in Christ affect me
as an individual?
Brummer then considers objections to the penal substitution theory of
the atonement commonly held in the Calvinist tradition. What ultimately
underlies the standard conceptual problems particular to Calvinist soteriology is the assumption of a contract-like relation between God and us:
our right to eternal happiness is ensured by God so long as we satisfy the
obligation to obey his laws. In this model God ends up primarily pursuing
retributive justice rather than restorative justice. In the reconciliation model,
however, God is primarily concerned with restoring the loving fellow
ship between two free agents, God and me as an individual. Anticipating
the Pelagian worry, Brummer argues that such a worry arises only if the
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contractual relation is assumed; love and forgiveness cannot be earned or
merited but are a free gift.
Concerning Christology, Brummer explicitly eschews Platonic onto
logical speculation about the divine and human nature of Christ, which
is responsible for an enormous controversy and division in the early
church. Again, it is the Fathers' Platonism that led to such knowledge of
the head rather than of the heart. Brummer thus suggests that we aban
don Platonic ontology and develop instead a more 'functional Christol
ogy,' which views the 'same nature' clause (homo-ousios) of the Chalcedonian Creed as a proclamation of the identity of Jesus' love and God's
love. Brummer thus states, "[Christ's] unity with the Father is a unity of
agency rather than a unity of Platonic 'nature'" (p. 87). For Brummer,
therefore, Christ could not be omnipotent and omniscient in the Platonic
ontological sense.
But in what sense is Jesus omni this and that? Following his commit
ment to the existential understanding of the doctrine, Brummer provides
no ontological account except an existential reading of Christology. Seeing
God's primary role as a forgiver who must bear the pain of our injury for
the sake of our fellowship with him, Christ's incarnation and suffering be
come the direct expression and enactment of divine forgiveness. Contrary
to the Patristics who connected Christ's miracles to his divinity and his
suffering to his humanity, Brummer's reconciliation model implies that it
is Christ's suffering that shows his divinity.
How does Brummer's model explain the trinity? Drawing from Wil
liam Alston's seminal paper on the trinity, Brummer argues that the Ar
istotelian category of substance (where primary substance refers to the
subsistent thing itself with all of its properties instantiated, and secondary
substance its essence, natural kind) explains the contemporary theologi
cal distinction between Latin Trinitarianism (LT) and Social Trinitarianism (ST). LT construes God's unity in the sense of primary substance and
the threeness in terms of secondary substance (i.e., distinct properties or
relations but not entities). On the contrary, ST entails the reversal of LT:
the persons are discreet primary substances, which together exemplify
one and the same essence, God. Concurring with Brian Leftow's charge
of tritheism (the trinity is no different than well-behaved Olympian gods),
Brummer claims that ST is not sufficient for monotheism. Furthermore,
the idea of loving fellowship between the persons in Richard of St. Victor's
ST, as well as Richard Swinburne's, by definition entails external relations,
as love requires a free exchange between two agents. Accordingly, love
relation must be used in a qualified sense—though possibly to the point
of equivocation.
Following the rejection of ST for failing to ground monotheism comes
Brummer's version of LT in which the threeness is explained in terms
of 'modes of agency': creation, revelation, and inspiration. In an attempt
to address the traditional worry about modalism, Brummer argues that
these modes are "three interconnected forms of action performed by
one and the same divine Agent" (p. 110), and not some roles God fulfills
consecutively. God remains in these acts, and does not take or abandon
roles temporarily. In response to ST's objection, that according to LT God
would be love only after he creates the world since love necessarily takes
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an object, Brummer appeals to Augustine's exhortation not to speculate
about what God did before creation. For we only have to do with God to
the extent that he relates to us; "faith is an existential and not a specula
tive enterprise" (p. 112). God's love is eternal in the sense of being always
dependable, and not that he has objects of love eternally.
Readers, I suspect, will find a different 'theoretical mood' in his treat
ment of the trinity from that of previous doctrines. That is, Brummer's view
of Platonic ontological thinking seems inconsistent—or at best murky. He
outright rejects it in his discussion of Christology. However, his affirma
tion of LT, which traces its origin to the very Platonic influence he wants to
undermine, ironically presupposes it. Despite his ontological commitment
to LT, he returns to his existential mood when dealing with ST's objection
that love necessarily takes an object. His own advice throughout the book,
namely that speculative finding beyond existential considerations must
be at best held apophatically or agnostically, however, seems inconsistent
with his clear rejection of ST and commitment to LT. (One might even
contend that ST, with loving fellowship as its conceptual foundation, has
more existential justification and relevance than LT.)
In the concluding chapter, Brummer lays out the implication of his
model for an interfaith dialogue. First, he notes that all three faith tra
ditions agree on 'the matrix of faith' (loving fellowship with God as ul
timate happiness, estrangement, and the need for revelation of divine
forgiveness and inspiration). Furthermore, rejecting ST and affirming the
'modes of agency' version of LT removes the initial difficulty for Jews and
Muslims to relate to Christians. But how is Christology handled? While
acknowledging the recalcitrant difference between the Christian view of
Jesus and that of the Jews and Muslims, Brummer nonetheless decisively
rejects Christian exclusivism, which claims that no 'real' knowledge of
God is possible without knowing Christ. Brummer finds such a claim to
be preposterous from the Christian point of view, for the incarnate Word
of God is "the same Word that was already revealed in the Torah" (p.120,
italics mine).
It is not clear what Brummer's objection really amounts to. If he rejects
exclusivism which denies any knowledge of God to the traditions outside
of Christianity, then he has set up a strawman; no Christians with an intel
ligible notion of general revelation would hold such an extreme view. If
Brummer's rejection of exclusivism, however, entails that the knowledge of
God obtained through properly knowing Christ is somehow qualitatively
the same as the knowledge of God obtained through some other means,
Brummer has misunderstood the core Christian soteriological claim.
While the incarnate Word might be the same Word revealed in the Torah
in the sense that they both have the same referent, the incarnate Word is
the full revelation of the compassionate love of God without which the full
knowledge of God, hence ultimate happiness, is unattainable.
Despite some lack of clarity and inconsistency, overall I find Brummer's
effort to explain Christian doctrines in an existentially relevant way for
all believers praiseworthy, and his insights derived therefrom worth our
serious attention. His book therefore provides a valuable contribution to
contemporary philosophical theology.

